In every well-designed identity and access management (IAM) strategy, there should be a plan for emergencies, especially for scenarios where all privileged access may be lost due to misconfigurations, outages, or security incidents. Thatβs where break-glass admin accounts come into play.
In this post, I will walk you through the importance of emergency access accounts, Microsoftβs recommendations, and how I recommend implementing a secure and resilient setup. (TL;DR, Configuration at the end)
π What is a Break Glass Account?
A break-glass account (or emergency access account) is a highly privileged account that can be used to regain administrative control over your tenant in situations where normal administrative access is unavailable.
Microsoft recommends that every organization should have at least two cloud-only emergency access accounts. These accounts should be isolated from normal operations and not be subject to Conditional Access, MFA registration policies, or automated cleanup processes.
βοΈ Break Glass Strategy
To ensure maximum availability and security, I would recommend the following structure:
π§βπΌ 1. Two Dedicated Cloud-Only Admin Accounts
Maintain two emergency access accounts (in case of accidental deletion) created natively in Microsoft Entra using the onmicrosoft.com
domain (e.g., bob@indefent.onmicrosoft.com
).
These accounts are:
- Cloud-only (not synced from on-premises)
- Not federated with any identity provider
- Isolated from groups in your production identity infrastructure
- 40+ character password
- Don't use names of celebrities like
tom.cruise@indefent.onmicrosoft.com
and don't use something likeemergency@indefent.onmicrosoft.com
orbreakglass@indefent.onmicrosoft.com
as they state the obvious
π₯ 2. Permanent Global Administrator Role Assignment
Both accounts are assigned the Global Administrator role permanently.
This is critical: if PIM is unavailable, misconfigured, or requires MFA to activate roles, it could prevent access when you need it most. Permanent assignment ensures that admin rights are always active and available.
To mitigate risks of permanent high privilege, we compensate with strict controls (e.g., isolation, alerting, and physical key security).
π 3. FIDO2 Security Keys β Passwordless and Offline-Ready
Authentication is handled exclusively with FIDO2 security keys, offering:
- Phishing-resistant login
- Independence from phones or network-dependent MFA
- No reliance on passwords, mobile apps, or SMS
Use two different hardware key models to diversify hardware risk and avoid dependency from one.
π¦ 4. Geographically and Physically Separated Key Storage
The FIDO2 keys are stored in separate, secure locations:
- π One is stored in a locked, fireproof cabinet at our primary office
- π§³ The second is held off-site, in a secure physical vault
So how does this could look with the break glass user bob@indefent.onmicrosoft.com
:

So we technically we now don't have a "single point of failure":

Access locations are/should be documented in a sealed emergency procedure binder, reviewed quarterly.
So now if you think of the worst scenario you could get... This setup ensures full access continuity / even if Daisy and Alice were to vanish mysteriously into the IT abyss.

π« 5. Exempt from all Conditional Access and Identity Protection
Both accounts are manually excluded from all Conditional Access (CA) policies (except CA for MFA and CA for Admin Portals MFA), ensuring:
- They are always able to sign in - even if CA rules become overly restrictive
- They are unaffected by MFA registration, device compliance, or network location restrictions
Also exclude these accounts from CAs where Identity Protection risk-based blocking to avoid false positives or lockouts --> So yeah, ALL Policies (except CA for MFA and CA for Admin Portals MFA)
π¨ 6. Usage Alerts and Zero Daily Use Policy
These accounts are not used for any operational tasks.
Create a new Log Analytics Workspace and setup the Alert Rule with High Severity for it - So we achive:
- All sign-ins trigger an immediate alert via LAW
- Events are investigated and logged as high-priority incidents
- Audit logs are retained and regularly reviewed
This ensures that if one is ever used, we know why, when, and by whom.
π 7. Quarterly Validation and Maintenance
We conduct a quarterly break-glass test, which includes:
- Verifying successful login with both accounts and keys
- Checking account and role integrity
- Validating exclusions from CA policies
- Confirming access paths and recovery documentation
Runbooks are stored securely both digitally and physically, and include clear step-by-step instructions for emergency access scenarios.
β Microsoftβs Recommendations Recap
From Microsoftβs official guidance on Emergency access accounts:
- β Have at least two emergency access accounts.
- β Use cloud-only identities (not synced from on-prem).
- β Exclude from all Conditional Access.
- β Use strong authentication methods (like FIDO2).
- β Store credentials offline and securely.
- β Audit and alert on any sign-in.
π Testing and Maintenance
Your emergency plan is only as strong as its last test:
- Perform a quarterly login test to ensure credentials, keys, and access paths are functional.
- Review and update documentation every quarter.
- Maintain an emergency runbook with access instructions under lock and key - both digitally and physically.
TL:DR, Configuration
π§βπΌ 1. Two Dedicated Cloud-Only Admin Accounts
- Create the User


π₯ 2. Permanent Global Administrator Role Assignment
- Assign the Global Administrator role

π 3. FIDO2 Security Keys - Passwordless and Offline-Ready
- Login with the created account and navigate to the security-info registration:
- Now setup both FIDO Keys and follow the instructions to set them up:

π¦ 4. Geographically and Physically Separated Key Storage
- π One FIDO should be stored in a locked, fireproof cabinet at your primary office
- π§³ The second FIDO should be held off-site, in a secure physical vault

π« 5. Exempt from all Conditional Access and Identity Protection
- Exclude from all CA's except Require MFA and Require MFA for Admin Portals

π¨ 6. Usage Alerts and Zero Daily Use Policy
- Create a Log Analytics workspace

- Create the alert rule


KUSTO with UPN
// Search for a single UserPrincipalName
SigninLogs
| project UserPrincipalName
| where UserPrincipalName == "bob@indefent.onmicrosoft.com" or UserPrincipalName == "alice@indefent.onmicrosoft.com"
KUSTO with Object ID
// Search for multiple Object IDs (UserIds)
SigninLogs
| project UserId
| where UserId == "00aa00aa-bb11-cc22-dd33-44ee44ee44ee" or UserId == "11bb11bb-cc22-dd33-ee44-55ff55ff55ff"

- Create an action group with your point of contact(s) via Email and/or Message/Push/Voice

- Setup the Alert rule Details

DisablePasswordExpiration
Update-MgUser -UserID <User Object ID> -PasswordPolicies "DisablePasswordExpiration"
π‘οΈ Final Thoughts
In the same way you wouldnβt run a data center without a fire suppression system, you shouldnβt run a Entra tenant without a recovery mechanism for privileged access.
By leveraging the native onmicrosoft.com
domain, FIDO2 keys, and strict access controls, you will have a resilient and secure emergency access strategy that aligns with Microsoft best practices - and one we hope youβll never have to use it for your own organization. ;)
For more detailed information, visit Microsoftβs documentation here:
π Emergency Access Accounts in Entra ID
β οΈ Disclaimer
The configurations shared in this post reflect my personal approach to solving this specific challenge. Every environment is unique, so adapt these solutions to fit your needs.
Happy configuring! π